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RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CULTURAL
CAPTIVITY OF RELIGION IN AMERICA: AN ARGUMENT
FOR RELIGIOUS PLURALISM
Charles R. Strain*
Stanley Hauerwas has one overriding concern: the cultural captiv-
ity of the Christian communities in America. The primary agent of
this captivity, the captor supreme, is the state. Its means of capture
is a benevolent tolerance of religious beliefs that, paradoxically, pro-
duces religious indifference. As such, the "political arrangements"
that we call at their highest level "the United States of America,"
and at a more focused level "the separation of Church and State,"
present an intractable challenge to committed Christians. Above all,
Hauerwas wishes to hold those individuals who have the audacity to
name themselves Christians to the seriousness of their calling. To
those who tout the American experiment in religious freedom, he
wants to make it abundantly clear that this freedom is not an ulti-
mate good. Indeed, in religious terms, it may be decidedly ambigu-
ous. The state does not possess, and therefore cannot confer, the
pearl of great price. The state cannot confer the treasure of eternal
life, enlightenment, or release from the karmic cycle. Additionally,
it cannot confer amazing grace. However, the state can, in subtle
ways, lull us into a fatal smugness, so much so that we no longer
know when we have qualified our loyalty to God in the name of the
state.
The burden of Hauerwas's argument is that the First Amend-
ment's sanctioning of religious beliefs, in distinction to religious con-
duct, privatizes religion and reduces it to the opinions of individuals
held in the sanctity of their hearts. The First Amendment thus pro-
tects religion by removing it from its context - a disciplined reli-
gious community - where religion may make a difference.
Hauerwas uses a telling analogy: The Free Exercise Clause is to
privatized religion as the Free Speech Clause is to talk radio shows;
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anything can be said or believed because none of it is to be taken
seriously. Everything becomes a matter of opinion.
The argument is disturbing for one who wishes to nurture the
transforming power of religious communities. However, the argu-
ment has several problems. First, the privatization of religion has
been shaped by many more cultural forces than the First Amend-
ment. The state is not the sole agent of cultural captivity. After all,
privatized religion is far more reflective of the ethos of a consumer
society than it is of Madison's vision in the Memorial and Remon-
strance.1 Furthermore, privatized religion does not necessarily evis-
cerate committed action, nor does it always reflect a vision of secu-
lar, enlightened individualism. To regain a sense of the inaugurating
power of a genuinely inner religious vision, read once more the trial
of Ann Hutchinson for the moment when she tells John Winthrop's
theocratic court that she has gathered a group of committed Chris-
tians outside the structures of authorized Puritan religious life be-
cause of an "immediate revelation." 2
Hauerwas is more telling when he argues that the relocation of
Christian belief into the individual's heart cleared a public space
which the "nonconfessional God" of "the religion of the nation"
proceeded to occupy.' I referred to Lynch v. Donnelly4 (the Paw-
tucket creche case) at an earlier conference of this Church/State
Center as a case in point. Because we go round and round with this
issue each year at this time, permit me to restate my earlier point.
In Lynch, the language of religious accommodation is used to affirm
religious symbols which are seen as part of a national heritage. 5 Jus-
tice O'Connor refers to "the legitimate secular purposes of solem-
nizing public occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and en-
couraging the recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in
society."6 These purposes do more than co-opt religious symbols. As
an authentic and specific Christian symbol, the creche proclaims
that confidence in the future is grounded in a God who chooses to be
1. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, reprinted in
THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON (Marvin
Meyers ed., rev. ed. 1981).
2. See THOMAS HUTCHINSON, THE HISTORY OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 482-
520 (1972).
3. Stanley Hauerwas & Michael Baxter, C.S.C., The Kingship of Christ: Why Freedom of
"Belief' Is Not Enough, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 107, 119-20 (1992).
4. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
5. Id. at 673.
6. Id. at 693 (O'Connor, J., concurring),
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revealed in the mystery of human birth. Sandwiched between a rein-
deer, clown, teddy bear, and an elephant, the creche is effectively
destroyed as a religious symbol. Lynch confirms Hauerwas's convic-
tion that religious communities must maintain the integral connec-
tion of belief and action centered in specific religious symbols.
However, Hauerwas would have us choose between polarized al-
ternatives: George Will versus Pope Pius X1. Who would not resist
this choice? The only other alternative seems to be an anemic lib-
eral tolerance, a bland civility which accents all positions because it
is either agnostic about all claims to religious truth, or, as in the
case of liberal Protestantism, because it sees an essential congruence
between the democratization and the christianization of America.
There are several problems with this way of posing alternatives.
First, to dismiss the Free Exercise Clause may be of little conse-
quence for those who, whatever their convictions, are fatefully born
into the mainstream of American life. Those who place the order of
the state as a supreme value find the specter of anarchy, as Justice
Scalia did recently in Employment Division v. Smith,' not in main-
stream religions, but in those culturally defined as alien, as other.
The Court allowed the "specter of anarchy" to prevail despite both
the centrality of the peyote ritual in the sacramental life of the Na-
tive American Church and the evidence before the Court that mem-
bers of that church, with its rigidly disciplined use of peyote, consti-
tuted no more threat to the respect for laws regarding controlled
substances than a priest consuming sacramental wine did during
Prohibition. To look only at the need for the Christian community
to maintain its integrity, and to ignore legal means for meeting the
needs of others, like the Native American Church, is un-Christian.
We need to prevent the Court, by rational persuasion, from veering
in George Will's direction as it did in Smith.
Second, central to this counter-argument to Hauerwas is the con-
viction that there are rival visions of the relationship of religious
conduct to the social order at work in the Court. Wisconsin v.
Yodere represents such an alternative vision and a commitment to a
pluralistic society which is not nearly so domesticated as Hauerwas
would have us believe. The tradition of voluntary communities as
the mainstays of democratic life is an idea that was brought to our
7. 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990).
8. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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awareness first by Alexis de Tocqueville.9 However, in cases like
Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court sustains vital pluralism, encouraging
vigorous interaction and contestation over the meaning of the.good
life in both the public and the private arena. In a more recent case,
Bob Jones University v. United States,10 Justice Powell, in a concur-
ring opinion which disagreed strongly with the Court's rationale,
demonstrated that it is possible to set appropriate limits to govern-
mental accommodation of religious social contributions through the
provision of tax exemptions which do not lead to a domestication of
religious life, but encourage the opposite. Powell stated:
In my opinion, ... [the Court's argument] ignores the important role
played by tax exemptions in encouraging diverse, indeed often sharply con-
flicting, activities and viewpoints. As Justice Brennan has observed, private,
nonprofit groups receive tax exemptions because "each group contributes to
the diversity of association, viewpoint, and enterprise essential to a vigorous,
pluralistic society." Far from representing an effort to reinforce any per-
ceived "common community conscience," the provision of tax exemptions to
nonprofit groups is one indispensable means of limiting the influence of gov-
ernmental orthodoxy on important areas of community life."
Powell is arguing again about an issue of governmental accommoda-
tion. However, the point I am making is that this opinion reflects a
vigorous support of pluralism in conduct, as in belief, within care-
fully stated limits as were transgressed by Bob Jones University. Ar-
guably, this pluralism is the true intent of the First Amendment.
Hauerwas, in his praise of Pius XI's imperial vision, carries his
laudable commitment to the integrity of religious communities to
some very disturbing conclusions. We must keep in mind, however,
that it is not Pius's vision of the Kingship of Christ, but rather Fa-
ther Metzger and Thomas Merton's vision that he finally com-
mends. These rival visions should not be confused. Apart from vig-
orous religious communities that nurture the kind of resistance
presented by Metzger and Merton, the state may become the kind
of co-opting idolatrous power that Hauerwas condemns. Yet, apart
from the freedom to debate and to enact our rival theological under-
standings, it will not be the Hauerwases whose visions will prevail,
but rather some narrow dogmatism. Whether it is secular or reli-
gious in character matters little.
My own religious reason for supporting the Free Exercise Clause
9. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 509-24 (J.P. Mayer ed., 1969).
10. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
11. Id. at 609 (Powell, J., concurring).
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can be stated in the words of Tao Te Ching, "The name which can
be named is not the Eternal Name."12 I can think of a hundred
similar aphorisms from my own Christian tradition and from other
traditions. If we accept this affirmation as a radical limit to our
claims to know ultimate truth, then the presence of other traditions
free to name other names, to call upon the Eternal Name in differ-
ent tongues, is absolutely vital to the integrity of the separate tradi-
tions. Religious communities can surely generate prophetic self-criti-
cism from within, but there is nothing like the presence of others,
living out their lives with religious integrity, to cause us to question
our own religious lives with the kind of seriousness that Hauerwas
demands.
12. LAO-Tzu, TAO TE CHING (D.C. Lau trans., 1963).
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